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Journalists' crisis management during the 22/7 domestic terror attack in Norway 
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Interest in crisis management among journalism scholars grew in the wake of the terror attacks 
of September 11, 2007. Yet, few studies explore journalists and their organizations from a 
newsroom and organizational crisis management perspective. In this study, we study 
journalists' ability to conduct news work when faced with a frame-breaking news event- in this 
case, the July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway. Dividing the journalistic response to these events into 
three stages, each with its own particular challenges, we have been able to unpack how these 
Norwegian journalists were capable of reporting on the events despite the chaos and 
uncertainty that followed in their wake, including the fact that the newsroom itself suffered 
severe damage from the bomb blast. This study shows that coping mechanisms in times of 
organizational stress will range from the expected (routine, habit) to the unexpected 
(improvisation, bricolage). The individual must pick up where the organization leaves off, relying 
upon experience and professionalism as well as face-to- face interaction and the assistance of 
whatever technology survives. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in crisis journalism 
connected to acts of terror-such as the attacks of September 11, 2001 in  the United States 
and related episodes in cities such as Madrid and London. An important factor in the 
success of crisis journalism is the ability of news media to adhere to their journalistic 
norms and standards at such abnormal and demanding moments (Nord and Stromback 
2006). The worst event s- that is, those that are genuinely unprecedented and shocking - 
immediately undermine both preparations and routines. These "frame breakers," by their 
very nature, cannot be reasonably anticipated, and challenge even the most established 
journalistic practices (Olsson 201O; Boin et al. 2005). Weick (1993, 633) characterizes these 
events as "cosmic episodes," whereby "people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe 
is no longer a rational, orderly system. What makes such an episode so shattering is that 
both the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse 
together." The terror attack of September 11, 2001 was one such event, during which a 
broadcaster had to improvise and to '"learn' 9/11 on screen" (Bouvier 2005, 25). 
  
In this study, we will explore how journalists coped with another frame breaker, the 
terror attacks in Norway in 2011, while virtually under attack themselves. On July 22 of that 
year, a 32-year-old Norwegian right-wing extremist carried out two sequential lone wolf 
domestic terror attacks against the Norwegian government, the civilian population and, in 
particular, a Workers' Youth League (AUF) summer camp situated in the Oslo region, in the 
Buskerud counties. The attacks started when the terrorist abandoned a car containing a 
huge bomb near the office block housing the office of the Prime Minister of Norway. 
The explosion killed eight people and injured at least 209. Afterward, the terrorist drove to 
the Labor Party's youth summer camp, impersonating a policeman in order to facilitate his 
systematic, cold-blooded execution of over 60 people, most young and some even 
children, at the island of Ut0ya. The attack was the deadliest in Norway since World War 11, 
claiming a total of 77 lives and wounding 319 people as well. 
Several of Oslo's media houses evacuated their staff in the immediate aftermath of 
the bomb detonation. However, few were directly impacted to the extent of  the 
newspaper offices of Verdens Gang (VG)1, where large windows facing the demolished 
government quarters were blown out, scattering glass both inside and outside and forcing 
the journalists to be evacuated immediately . After regrouping a safe distance away, the 
journalists soon divided into two groups. The majority, a mix of newspaper journalists and 
online reporters, followed the editors to another building and eventually ended  up  in 
suites at a nearby hotel. A few other online reporters, on the other hand, worked their 
way back into the newsroom of the closed VG building. In what follows, we will focus 
mostly upon this latter group, which most directly faced the challenges associated with 
the viable practice of crisis journalism during a frame-breaking event. We will ask the 
following questions: 
RQ1: What were the key challenges-physical, organizational/structural, and intellectual/ sense 
making- facing the VG Nett online journalists who attempted to cover this event under such 
duress? 
RQ2: How did these journalists meet those challenges? 
Based on interviews with the journalists, we will track an organizational 
progression from chaos and granularity through the restoration of some limited 
newsroom functionality to a further, additional collapse at a later stage in the coverage, 
when a sudden relocation of the staff exposed, among other things, underlying 
organizational rivalries and competitiveness. 
 
Routines, Improvisations, and Discourses of Professionalism 
 Previous studies dealing with crisis and journalism have focused, among other things, 
on the role of media-related rituals (Durham 2008), the interaction between journalists 
and audiences (Robinson 2009), how journalistic standards and professional roles impact 
on crisis news coverage (Usher 2009; Olsson and Nord 2015), and the importance of new 
information technologies (Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess 2013; Lim 2013). To date, 
however, there are few studies on crisis reporting from an organizational news-production 
perspective. Still in thrall to the wave of sociological news-production research of the 
1970s and 1980s, today's newsroom studies continue to regard news organizations  as 
constrained  by structural  bureaucratic  aspects that chain reporters  to 
their routines  (Ryfe 2006). According  to  Tuchman  (1975, 150), control is the requisite basis 
of news production, and control is constantly at risk from "the amount of work to be done 
and the number of individuals who must participate in the task." In order to maintain 
control, journalists rely heavily on routines and standardized forms of production. In turn, 
Berkowitz (1992) observes, news work in non-routine conditions must be guided by 
improvisation and negotiation, much of which involves adapting existing routines to the 
new conditions. In following  adapted  versions  of their  everyday  routines, journalists are 
able to devise procedures to handle surprises in which the rules governing the coverage of 
a "what-a-story" are invoked by citing a similar "what-a-story" (Tuchman 1973, 128). 
Few studies engage with improvisation among journalists during severe crisis events 
from an organizational perspective, though Ottosen and Andences Bull (2012) interviewed 
four editorial managers at two national Norwegian newspapers, Dagb/adet and 
Aftenposten, about the organization of their work during the July 22 attack. Several of 
their conclusions resonate with this study in terms of how the chaotic situation influenced 
news coverage, particularly during the evacuation of the newspaper Aftenposten, as 
journalists sought to satisfy the audience's need for detailed information despite the 
obvious obstacles to their work. Kammer (2013) investigated how Norwegian and Danish 
newspapers covered the July 22 attack in real time and pointed to the impact of digital 
journalism on the success of the journalism. In a study concerning how Swedish news 
organizations handled the September 11, 2001 attacks, Olsson (2009) demonstrates that 
organizational sense making, history, and culture all determined the newsroom's ability to 
improvise, and that routines and improvisation are not entirely opposite poles but rather 
variously overlapping modes of journalistic practice . 
The focus on routines in previous studies of news production is understandable since 
routines are in general understood as governing professional behavior and serve as a 
guiding light for journalists regarding what to do in a given situation (Larson  1977; 
  
Friedson 1986). Generally speaking, routines serve as shortcuts for practices connected to 
underlying professional ideals and standards . The literature on journalistic ideals is vast but 
in general journalists are thought of as adhering to the following five ideals: public service 
(a "watchdog" mentality), objectivity, autonomy, immediacy, and ethics and legitimacy 
(Deuze 2005, 447). Journalism as an institution can be divided into two main areas: social 
practices, which involve policies, routines, procedures, and relations, and cosmology, 
which relates to values, norms, perceptions, and culture. Together, these two areas give 
rise to common attitudes and behaviors and thereby reduce uncertainty by providing 
direction (Ekstrom 2002, 268). The full complexity of journalism as an institution can be 
uncovered in routines of production where "the combination of professional training and 
routinized practice corresponds to a high degree of consensus on story selection, reporting 
angles, and trends in the profession" (Lance, Gressett, and Haltom 1985, 55). Of great 
interest here, Aldridge and Evetts (2003, 547) also argue that professionalism can be 
mobilized by employers as a form of self-discipline. The question addressed in this study is 
whether journalists' notion of professionalism is so profound that it can provide them with 
guidance even during major crises. Also what is the connection between professionalism 
and routines and practices? Evetts (2006, 140) describes organizational professionalism as 
a rational-legal matrix of decision making, hierarchical structures of authority, and the 
standardization of work practices. She describes occupational professionalism, in turn, as 
dependent upon more discretionary decision making in more complex contexts in relation 
to collegial authority. For example, journalists "on the floor" at times consult one another 
and draw upon shared expertise, education, and training. 
In this article, we are interested in news events in which journalists find it hard to 
apply routine responses to discretionary decision making and newsroom coordination and 
must instead improvise. Due to the lack of research on such events, we apply a theoretical 
framework on sense making and organizational resilience developed by organizational 
researcher Karl Weick. According to Weick (1993), four key resources facilitate 
organizational resilience and improvisation in situations of chaos: (1) improvisation and 
bricolage, (2) virtual role systems, (3) the attitude of wisdom, and (4) respectful 
interaction. Improvisation and bricolage can be cultivated to support creativity even under 
intense pressure. Virtual role systems refer to organizational member's ability to preserve 
the organizational role system in their minds when it falls apart in the physical world. The 
attitude of wisdom refers to the fact that people are aware that they do not fully 
understand what is going on, simply because they have never been in the exact situation 
before. Both extreme confidence and excessive caution "destroy what organizations most 
need in changing times, namely, curiosity, openness, and complex sensing" (641). Finally, 
 respectful interaction highlights the need for face-to-face interaction in facilitating social 
constructions under duress. 
In the analysis that follows, we will explore the aspects of routine, improvisation, and 
professionalism in relation to the ways in which VG Nett journalists coped with the 
challenges of reporting the July 22 terror attacks in Norway. 
 
Method 
This study is based on interviews conducted with managers, editors, and reporters at 
the Norwegian newspaper VG, with a particular focus on online journalists (VG Nett) . We 
focus upon VG because the media house was literally hit during the terror attack and 
therefore stands out as a unique case of crisis journalism in practice. The study is part of 
larger research project that incorporates 25 semi-structured interviews with staff from the 
Norwegian Broadcast Corporation (NRK), TV2, and VG. The data gathering took place from 
the end of July 2011 until the middle of October 2011. Most of the informants worked as 
reporters on the day in question, and several editors were interviewed as well. 
The newspaper VG was established a short time after World War II and quickly achieved 
nationwide distribution; it was later to  be  the  first  newspaper  in  Norway  to change to a 
tabloid format (in 1963) (Konow-Lund and Puijk 2012). The Schibsted Group bought the 
newspaper on June 1, 1966 but chose to maintain it  as  a  separate  company (Eide 1995, 536). 
Over the last decade, the printed newspaper has seen a sharp drop in circulation, from a peak 
in 2002 of 390,510 to 211,588 in  2011  (H0st  2012). On the other  hand, VG's digital platforms 
(online, mobile, iPad, video) have enjoyed a huge increase in audience numbers. In fact, VG 
Nett has always been the most popular news website in Norway, with more than 1,278,912 
unique users (2014 TSN Gallup). 
At VG, we conducted eight interviews, each lasting between 40 and 90 minutes. Our 
informants differed with regard to experience and competence. The main part of the 
interviews focused on actions taken and decisions made in the first hours after the terror 
attacks. The interviews were very open, and the overarching question was, "What did you 
do when you found out about the attack(s)?" The interviewees were then encouraged to 
tell their own stories as far as they could remember them. Follow-up questions focused on 
interesting perspectives introduced by the interviewees and on themes from previous 
research in the field. The interviews aimed to capture both the actual actions taken and 
the perceptions of the situation, and the open-ended questions made it possible for the 
interviewees to focus on what they themselves thought was important. It must be said, of 
course, that retrospective accounts like those related in interviews can be biased in 
different ways. The most obvious problem is the inability of respondents to remember 
  
accurately the event in question. Moreover, respondents might also distort information for 
personal or organizational reasons. In order to compensate for this as best we could, we 
deliberately reviewed all of our responses for consistency. 
Based on these data, we developed a narrative to describe the events of the day. 
Using the narrative as the basis for our analysis, we then singled out important decisions, 
actions, and attitudes related to routines, improvisation, and professionalism, all in order 
to better understand how journalists handle a situation where their daily routines and 
practices are no longer applicable. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Phase I: What is This Story? 
During the initial phase immediately following the July 22 terror attacks, the 
overarching VG organization dissolved (or appeared to), leaving its staff members without 
the benefits of oversight or strategic guidance from above. Like other media houses, the 
traditional newspaper VG was completely taken by surprise by the event. It appears that 
there was no fallback plan for such an attack, and this forced the organization to depend 
on managers' and individual journalists' ad hoc improvisational measures. This sudden 
vacuum lasted for approximately one hour, from 3:25 to 4:20 pm. 
People's initial reactions to the event included both excitement and shock. Many 
respondents recalled that their colleagues rose and ran toward the explosion, rather than 
away from it, which they saw as consistent with the journalistic  instinct  of wanting  to 
know what was happening. The severe damage to the VG building could not be seen from 
the fifth floor, though some of the journalists noticed that windows had been blown out. 
Although the situation was chaotic, no one actually panicked. In spite of a howling fire 
alarm, for example, people walked rather than ran down staircases. Even the explosion 
itself was not so much heard as felt, as suction in the midsection. In the first moments 
after the bomb exploded, people felt disbelief, sometimes coupled with a sense of 
absurdity. The situation was impossible to understand, and, as had been the case on 
September 11, 2001, VG journalists had a hard time making sense of what was unfolding 
on the ground and had to rely on colleagues with better access to information, just  like  
the general public did. 
As it all began to sink in, the journalists reacted like everyone else and started to 
worry about friends and family. Phones were mainly used at first to check on the 
whereabouts of loved ones rather than to follow up on journalistic leads as such (though 
some journalists also tried to call the police, without getting through). Informants 
explained that the whole VG media  house was promptly  evacuated, and that between   
 50 and 100 journalists ended up simply milling about on the streets outside. While some 
chose to leave the scene, other remained to see what would happen, and still others 
began to "document" the damage they saw. A very experienced journalist recalled being 
scared that there might be another bomb, but once he checked on his family, he was 
ready to go to work. He was not in the VG building when the bomb exploded but came 
from elsewhere: 
Me personally, well I suppose I was afraid that there would be another explosion. But I wasn't 
that scar ed. If I had been really scared I would have run far away [from the VG building]. Many 
of my colleagues did, ran far away, and I fully understand that. But somehow, I wasn't quite 
there either. It kind of felt ok to stay. And when the police said, "Get out of here!" I understood 
why they were saying that, but I wasn't terrified. After all, I did go back into VG [VG building and 
the VG Nett News desk] afterwards I knew that everyone at VG had to evacuate. I
 figured  that they  had probably  not been  able to 
bring the equipment with them, and that, since I had a camera, I should take some pictures. 
(informant, interview, September 30, 2011) 
The desire to check on one's own family first, however understandable, reflects a 
breakdown of newsroom procedure and organizational hierarchy in the  moments  just 
after the attack. No one, for example, reacted first by seeking instruction from a supervisor. 
Instead, all of the informants reported making their initial choices for themselves. One 
experienced reporter later lamented the fact that he did not walk around the government 
building to see the bomb crater firsthand, even though a VG main principle during 
breaking news is to confirm the facts as quickly as possible. Afterward, he noted that if he 
had seen the crater with his own eyes, his analyses of what it was all about would 
probably have been less speculative . 
In fact, few experienced breaking-news journalists headed right over to Grubbegaten, 
the demolished street behind the government quarters where the car with the bomb had 
been parked. One reporter said that this was because the destruction was so immense - 
though he had a lot of experience with breaking news, he had not previously covered either 
war or terrorism and therefore had little experience upon which to draw. According to 
Berkowitz (1992) and Tuchman (1973), journalists manage to cope with even genuinely 
surprising events by drawing upon their experiences with other surprising events. However, 
at this stage no such analogies were available to most of the VG Nett journalists, except for 
one who had experienced the terror attack in London in 2005. He said that he had waited for 
something similar to occur in Norway ever since, and likely due to his prior experience and 
mental preparedness, he was the one who took charge of the situation and reminded 
  
everyone else to remember equipment such as mobile phones, chargers, and the like as they 
left the VG building . Experience with regular breaking news was relevant as well, but not 
until later, during the second phase of the event, when the informants had returned to the 
news desk and begun to cover the story by following their familiar routines and practices. 
While some of the journalists moved as far away from the VG building as they could, 
others chose to wait for instructions just outside the doors, and five online reporters 
followed a very different instinct indeed, choosing to return to their main  online  
newsroom in the VG building (see e.g. the map of the area, with videos, at htt p://www. 
vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/2 2-juli/ sli k-skjedde-angrepene.php). In the entry foyer, a 
female security guard barred their ent ry, despite appearing to be in a state of shock 
herself. Some of them made their way back to their newsroom regardless, though they 
were conflicted about it: 
I was pretty scared as I ran, particularly when I was running up the stairs here, I thought that 
this was a bit crazy . .. Because by that time we had started to understand the situation a bit 
more, and seen the people and the chaos outside on the street. We knew there was [broken] 
glass ... and we realized that it was probably a bomb . (informant, interview, August 23, 2011) 
Few other journalists from VG and VG Nett followed them, but they pressed ah ead, 
simply hoping to get back to the location where they felt they were most  in control. They  
seem to have concluded  that routines,  practices, and professional  decision  making  would be 
restored quickest to those who regained their familiar workspaces. Still, there was a risk 
involved, in that nobody could say for certain that there was not a second bomb . 
 
The one managing editor who had entered with the group said repeatedly that no one 
had to remain in the newsroom. Each person had to be responsible for his or her own 
choice to stay: 
He [the managing editor] said, " . .. You have to be here of your own free will. In other words, 
you are here voluntarily. I can't vouch for your security if you stay here," so in that sense the 
topic was discussed. (informant, interview, September 30, 2011) 
This illustrates how difficult it is for managers, like journalists, to balance between 
effective routines and risk-taking departures from them in situations that are new. On the 
one hand, the editorial manager had to place responsibility for personal security on the 
individual in question, though no one could say what was safe at that time. On the other 
hand, of course, it benefited the organization as a whole to have representatives at the 
news desk in the VG building. The entire group of journalists decided to stay. The fact that 
these journalists did not seek instructions from a supervisor should be understood against 
 the backdrop of the everyday organizational culture at VG, which emphasized freedom 
and responsibiliyy. The newspaper tried to foster a culture where individual journalists 
would be able to take responsibility for themselves and their work, though direction was 
always available from above as well (Konow-Lund 2013). However, during the crisis 
journalism phase of the July 22 attack coverage, this latent individualism went even  
further in several cases. 
Despite their decision to stay, some of the informants invoked the series of attacks on 
September 11, 2001 in the United States to underline that the current event might not be 
over. Still, the informants stressed that they felt at that time that they ought to return to 
their responsibilities. One journalist stated that, given his experience with breaking news, 
he would be expected to return to his work. Importantly, most of the informants 
emphasized that, though they did not understand what had happened, they  felt 
compelled to communicate with their audience as best they could. It thus seems  as 
though the journalists managed to adhere to their professional roles by picturing the 
audience members and their need for information. In so doing, the journalists made use of 
the strategy of virtual role systems, whereby they managed to keep their journalistic roles, 
and various specific tasks, intact in their minds even though the physical structure around 
them was falling apart. The journalists agreed that the news desk was the most effective 
place from which to work, and it was also the number that sources knew to call. It thus 
seems as though the physical structure of the newsroom facilitated the journalists' desire 
to stay together and maintain face-to-face contact, which, according to Weick's (1993) 
theories of organizational resilience, helps such groups to improvise under tough 
conditions. 
 
Phase II: Organizational and Professional Rec onstruction 
In the second phase, the journalists sought to reestablish routines and practices even 
though they faced both technological and communication challenges. This phase took 
place from about 4:20 pm until the journalists had to leave the VG building again at 7:30 
pm. Gradually the organization restored a proper newsroom. For one thing, the reporters 
who had returned to the online desk set up a temporary hierarchy that allocated specific 
tasks to each staff member. As it turned out, those who found their way back filled 
different and complementary roles at the news desk anyway-there were three online 
reporters, two front editors, and an editorial manager. This particular group composition 
proved very useful. Informants noted, among other things, that the editorial manager was 
very detailed and specific when he handed out tasks, which helped to enable the 
necessary reconstruction of the organization and the restoration of everyday practices as 
  
well as any further improvisation . 
When VG Nett was up and running, the journalists started to organize their work. Key 
challenges included obtaining an overview of the situation and getting in touch with the 
most important sources. When the journalists finally managed to get hold of sources, 
however, the loud fire alarm made it nearly impossible to hear what they said . Moreover, 
no one could get to all of the tips on an overloaded tip line: 
We sat there, with the fire alarm howling for about two hours more or less. I was so fed up 
with that fire alarm. In addition, all the telephones were ringing all the time. And we couldn't 
possibly answer them. And we were swamped with e-mails; in addition we had some technical 
problems due to heavy [online) traffic. (informant, interview, September 30, 2011) 
Staff improvisation during this phase involved finding solutions to the structural 
disruption-for example, using Facebook and Twitter as a way to confirm or test one's facts. 
When it proved impossible to reach official sources, one of the reporters used his own 
direct observations from outside the government building as a way to  write one of  the 
earliest stories about the attacks. Several informants pointed out that, because family and 
friends would try to contact them and disturb their work, they wrote messages on 
Facebook saying that they were fine and "Don't contact me." As we can see, the 
journalists' reactions had changed considerably from the first phase of the event. Now, 
knowing that their families were safe, their professional identities took over. Furthermore, 
this professionalism facilitated improvisation and the ability to contextualize details in new 
ways. When, for example, the reporters were given Post-It notes from the operators with 
phone numbers of callers but no other information, they needed to decide on the spot 
whether they were going to use valuable time to check them out. One reporter found a 
note saying "shooting" with a phone number but never thought to connect it to the 
explosion at the government building: 
Among the Post -It notes, there was one that said "Shooting," and there was also a phone 
number . .. Someone said .. . there had been some kind of shooting in Northern Buskerud. Just 
like everyone else, I thought "Ok, so what?" A bomb has exploded in Oslo 
... We thought it [the shooting) was just someone who had shot somebody.  Like domestic 
violence or something. That's what people thought. We didn't think that there was a 
connection when we heard "Shooting in Northern Bus kerud."2 (informant, interview, 
September 30, 2011) 
As it turned out, of course, the Norway terror  attack  had  two  parts :  the car  bomb that 
detonated at the government building opposite the VG  offices ,  and  the  shooting assault less 
 than two hours later at a summer camp on the island of Ut0ya  that  was organized by the 
youth division of the Norwegian  Labor  Party  (AUF).  The  challenge  for both the functioning 
VG Nett team and their colleagues around the world  was  to  keep  up with these events both 
effectively and compellingly , and initially, as well, to  make  and deepen the link between the 
two. 
During this work at the online news desk, a policeman and a representative  from the fire 
brigade turned up at the VG offices and tried to force the journalists to move. They insisted on 
staying, and the officials eventually accepted their need to do so . The serendipitous visit 
from the police officer and firefighter would  produce  a  breakthrough for the journalists' 
understanding of the sequential nature of the attacks. While the officials were in the 
newsroom, the policeman received a message on his radio that alerted the VG Nett 
reporters to the possibility that something was going on at Ut0ya, which they eventually 
linked to the shooting announced on the Post-It: 
While they [the police and the fire department] are there, they receive a report about a 
shooting in Northern Buskerud on their radios. And they tell us: "We have to go. We have a 
shooting in Northern Buskerud ." It was something like that they said. And we thought; "OK, 
now they are leaving too. What's going on here?" And then we quite quickly realize that this 
has to do with Ut0ya. (informant, interview, September 30, 2011) 
The policeman said little, but the reporter with the Post-It decided to check it out. The 
phone number on the note turned out to belong to a source who had escaped from Ut0ya. 
This episode indicates that journalistic experience, coupled with an ability to improvise, 
generates coverage even under unfamiliar and stressful circumstances, especially when 
everyone was able to work together. 
During the event social media played an important role. Informants explained that 
many social media users knew somebody who had been affected by the terror attacks at 
the government building or on Ut0ya. Because important sources were generally 
inaccessible during much of the event, social media could be exploited as an alternative 
means of confirmation of the accuracy of one's story. According to the front editor, social 
media was used to facilitate a two-way dialogue between content being continuously 
published online and the revision of the facts in light of user feedback, which helped them 
to ultimately understand the full scope of the terror events (front editor, interview, August 
23, 2011). 
At the same time, many foreign journalists were trying to get through to the VG Nett 
reporters in order to acquire information. Everyone wanted to know who was behind the 
attack, and several of the informants recalled the intensity of this professional pressure. VG 
  
Nett professionalism was put to the test as speculation went wild and the New York Times 
published a story stating that lslamists were behind the attack. It was strict VG policy that 
reporters should not speculate (Konow-Lund 2013). Also, one of the online reporters who 
was helping out from home knew Arabic and checked a number of AI-Qaida websites, 
where he found several groups claiming responsibility for the attack. This made the online 
reporters even more skeptical about the rampant speculation. According to Ottosen and 
Bull (2014), VG Nett did refer to Al Qaida in their reports during the first hour after the 
attack in the context of lslamist-inspired terror, but VG Nett never quoted the New York 
Times or make this connection unequivocally: 
For example, we did not quote the New York Times, which reported that an Islamic group had 
accepted responsibility. Even though ... the New York Times is normally a pretty reliable source 
for quite a lot of information. But I chose not to publish it ... and did not spend a lot of time on 
the matter. It didn't quite fit the picture of what we ... of the information  we were receiving. 
(managing editor online, interview, September  16, 2011) 
In the end, it did not make sense to these journalists that it was an Al Qaida attack. 
They asked themselves whether Al Qaida could possibly have gathered so much 
information about this Norwegian county and the time and place of a summer camp for 
the youth division of the Norwegian Labor Party. This skepticism was facilitated by the 
interaction that was made possible at the news desk even in the midst of the event, and by 
the organizational maxim "When in doubt, leave it out".3 This vignette demonstrates that 
even when technology was not available as such, the journalists clung to their professional 
practices and routines rather than look to other media sources to supplement their 
coverage for them. 
In this second phase of the coverage, VG Nett journalists clearly restored their 
professional outlook and practices. As Weick (1993) emphasized in his analysis of the Mann 
Gulch fire disaster, improvisation and creativity are equally vital when one must perform 
under intense pressure, but, as he demonstrates in his article, it is easier to improvise when 
one's surroundings are familiar and there is room for personal interaction. The VG Nett 
journalists must have grasped this instinctively when they decided to return to the 
newsroom, despite the restrictions, to carry on with their work. 
 
Phase Ill: Disintegration and Com petition 
At around 7:30 pm on the night of the attack, the editorial manager phoned in a 
message from the editor-in-chief, who was insisting that the remaining journalists at the VG 
building should evacuate as soon as possible. The reporters carried what equipment they 
 could from the VG building into the deserted streets of Oslo and went to the Hotel Bristol, 
where several hotel rooms and suites had been rented by VG. Settled into a suite at the 
Bristol, they could finally concentrate on producing and updating their website. Some of 
the study informants later observed that it would have helped this effort if the staff had 
been allocated a large conference room rather than a number of suites and individual 
rooms. 
With hindsight, of course, the transition from the VG building to the Bristol appeared 
smoother and less chaotic than it actually was. First of all, when the group arrived  at the 
Bristol, all of the suites were occupied and reporters were dispersed to  individual  rooms, 
which made communication among them  difficult.  One  experienced  reporter  noted  how 
vital internal communication was and described the situation  at  the  Bristol  as  "frantic  
chaos" (informant, interview, September 30, 2011) in relation to the relative calm of the VG 
Nett newsroom. When the online group first arrived at the  hotel,  they  found  colleagues 
sitting in corridors, writing stories while leaning against the walls. However, there was no 
longer the feeling of life-threatening  disaster  that  the  journalists  had  experienced  at  the 
VG building. Instead, they felt renewed pressure to produce their news in a  satisfactory 
fashion . One informant noted, "It was chaos ... but an organized chaos, sort  of. People worked 
and different newsworkers focused on their own tasks, and from an overall perspective, the  
work  was  controlled"  (informant, interview, September  29, 2011). Despite a dearth of 
computers, mobile charger s, and other devices, everyday newsroom routines, such as 
nominating a specific journalist to oversee the main script of the story, helped to organize the 
work. 
The main difference between the VG Nett newsroom and the Hotel Bristol was the 
physical layout and its impact upon the positioning of people in various rooms. Compared 
to the VG Nett newsroom, where everyone was together , the Bristol necessitated the 
division of the organization physically into various sub-units with different statuses and 
tasks. This undermined the ability of staff members to interact face to face. The VG online 
group was assigned what one informant thought was the last suite, which happened to be 
three floors below the other allocated suites, which obviously complicated internal 
communication. Moreover, the work at the Bristol was hampered by the lack of tools that 
the reporters were accustomed to using on a daily basis. Just logging on to the homepage 
to edit it was difficult, even though there were IT developers to find a way around the 
problems. Likewise, the lack of multiple TV screens-which are common to every 
newsroom-made an overview of outside media coverage impossible. In general, 
everything became more manual rather than automated, and computers, charged phones, 
iPads, and chargers were scarce. One informant recalled how other media houses were 
  
interviewing sources while equipped with computers, phones, and even bulletproof vests, 
while VGs reporter would arrive with pens and notebooks, dressed in their tee shirts. 
At the same time, the environment was described as caring; informants recalled that 
staff members were allowed to eat and drink whatever they wanted for free, and that a 
crisis therapist was present within a few hours of the first attack. When a young reporter 
declared that she should have been at Ut0ya, where many of her friends had been killed, 
and that her closest family members were not even in Oslo, her colleagues hurried to 
comfort her. Later that evening, several middle-aged journalists with children who were 
the same age as the Ut0ya youth headed home because their children had lost friends. 
One informant said that he wished management had chosen a hotel that was further from 
the VG building, for safety but also for emotional distance. Compared to phase 11, the 
emotional stress of phase Ill become worse at the Bristol, especially as more and more 
journalists returned to the newsroom after having met with relatives of the victims. In 
other words, although the location was not exactly ideal for those staff members who had 
chosen to return to the VG newsroom, they had been able to remain at a distance from 
what some outgoing reporters experienced as emotional exposure. Meetings with relatives 
of dead or wounded victims, friends of victims, or the victims themselves at a time when 
confusion reigned led to enormous emotional stress. Some informants even suggested 
that they were lucky to be able to concentrate on specific tasks and thereby escape the 
responsibility of continuously following the massive media coverage of the ongoing event. 
Due to the scale of the demand for information, journalists from both  the newspaper and 
the website worked together closely, despite the different speeds of their respective 
production processes. Still, the time at the Bristol also revealed a certain intra- 
organizational competition. All were competing for stories from the same pool of 
interviews and observations, and all wanted to release their stories  right away rather 
than saving something for a later edition . Several reporters ended up annoyed at being 
left out of the bylines of the (relatively historical) coverage the following day, wondering 
to themselves, "Why didn't I have a byline?" (informant, interview, September 30, 2011). 
Some ultimately surrendered to the longstanding competitiveness between the 
newspaper- per people and the online people, but others took the opportunity to 
develop or expand connections with those on the other side (informant, interview, 
September 30, 2011 ). The newspaper and the website had merged a year before the 
terror attack, and official 
guidelines stated that the two should cooperate. In the end, they did. 
In this last phase, then, the VG Nett group dealt with a new work site and a lack of 
technology, as well as the emotional burden of meeting with journalists who had been to 
 Ut0ya in person. At the same time, things began to normalize in relation to the situation at 
the VG Nett building, where the threat of an additional attack remained so vivid. 
Managers arriving at the hotel had to organize whoever was there and meet expectations 
for a restoration of normal functioning. In turn, this last phase was characterized by the 
appearance of some competitiveness between both groups and individuals. As the 
situation became less directly dangerous, journalists stopped making use of specific 
improvisation techniques such as trying to compensate for not being able to get in touch 
with colleagues or even sources and started practicing normally again. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
Crisis journalism involving frame-breaking events such as the July 22 attacks cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the notion of journalistic professionalism 
and its impact on improvisation as a precondition for the ability to cover the news. With 
this article, we have tried to supplement a scholarly understanding of how journalists 
handle terror incidents, particularly in cases where they are not only required to cover the 
attack but also come under attack themselves. It has long been assumed that journalists 
cover extraordinary events by referring to similar events in the past and modifying 
everyday routines as necessary. In this case, very few such references or directions were 
available . In addition, the organization itself fell apart initially , which undermined all of 
those journalistic routines deriving from interpersonal interaction and the presence of 
supervision (as well as technology). In this study, on the other hand, we saw that the VG 
Nett journalists, faced with a host of unfamiliar challenges, solved them through a host of 
sometimes novel coping mechanisms during each phase of the event. 
Right after the bomb exploded near the VG building, journalists struggled with their 
own sense of shock and disbelief as well as a lack of organizational structure and 
leadership . What followed was a shift in balance from the reliance on a clear organizational 
hierarchy to a necessary empowerment of the individual. Due to the temporary lack of 
organizational structure and leadership, both personal and professional responsibilities 
were put upon the individual staff members. Relying on their professionalism, they tried to 
compensate for the new circumstances by creating a virtual organization through which 
roles and tasks were allocated as would have been "normally" (Weick 1993). After a while, 
a core group of VG Nett journalists emerged, preserving the crucial aspect of personal 
interaction first in the VG Nett newsroom, then in the Hotel Bristol. Organizational 
rebuilding, starting in the newsroom, was based on improvisation and instinct rather than 
calculation, because no precedent existed for such a challenge. The newsroom proved to 
be the best place to restore routines and professionalism, given its familiar surroundings 
  
and, at least to some extent , technology. In the second phase, the core group built up a 
workable  ad  hoc structure that allowed its members  to  function  as individual journalists 
and  as  a  newsroom-contacting  sources, making  sure that  the  information technology 
was working, and checking information. A key coping mechanism in this second phase is 
what Weick (1993) called "respectful interaction," which compensates for the lack of 
formal structure and management in a crisis situation by allowing members to engage face 
to face in the sense-making process that was necessary for them to start fulfilling their 
professional responsibilities. In this case, respectful interaction was made possible by the 
small size of the group and the physical structure of the large newsroom. 
In the third phase, the VG Nett staffers regrouped at the Bristol, where the rest of the 
VG organization had set up shop. The group got the last available hotel suite, located three 
floors below the other staff members, so communication with them was difficult. The 
evacuation from the VG newsroom had taken these journalists from their known 
environment and forced them to adapt  to  a completely  new  one, albeit  one that  was 
not about to be shut down by the authorities due to the threat of another attack. At the 
Bristol, then, the obstacles were less psychological than physical-a lack of space, 
computers, mobiles, batteries, monitors, tables, chairs, and so forth. Yet routines  began 
to stabilize nevertheless, allowing the staff to generate a continuous workflow, despite all 
of the challenges. It should also be noted that the journalists managed to coordinate their 
own work, and to work in teams, despite the lack of an overarching structure and the 
presence of what one journalist called "frantic chaos." As everyone pitched in, everyday 
organizational characteristics such as tension, competitiveness, and rivalry resurfaced, 
which eventually hampered organizational improvisational capacity. In this phase, that is, 
professionalism encouraged not only positive coping mechanisms but also negative 
aspects such as competition and rivalry. 
Based on the findings of this study, we conclude that societies become even more 
vulnerable to the repercussions of terror attacks when media organizations are directly 
affected as well. In such extreme situations, most journalists lack relevant previous 
experience and must look elsewhere to inform their responses. Hence, this study shows 
that coping mechanisms in times of organizational stress will range from the expected 
(routine, habit) to the unexpected (improvisation, bricolage). Moreover, the study shows, 
in contrast to classic research on news production, that individual journalists' 
understanding of an event and individual actions do matter, and this sometimes has 
significant consequences for crisis decision making, and, accordingly, the ability to report 
on the event. During a frame breaker, the individual must pick up where the organization 
leaves off, relying upon experience and professionalism as well as face-to-face interaction 
 and the assistance of whatever technology has survived. It is not only the day-to-day 
routine itself but also its profound disruption that lends the clearest insight into the 
contemporary practice of journalism in the digital age.  
 
NOTES 
1. Verdens gang means ''The way of the world" in English. Although VG newspaper and VG Nett 
remained daily collaborators in 2011, we focus on the group that worked  with  online news in 
this study. 
2. Buskerud is a county in Hole municipality in Norway. Ut0ya is a small island in Buskerud county. 
3. The maxim "when in doubt, leave out" refers to certain guidelines at VG Nett. In a recent 
ethnographic study, the organizational culture was characterized by its emphasis on 
responsibility and awareness when making choices (Konow-Lund 2013). 
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